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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LIVINIA ALLEN, also known as )\ 
Livinia Smith, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
\ 
E~~ ~~E~: !ts~~f: ~:~k::!G~ \( 
Alfred Saunders Allen, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No .. 7247 
That on the 12th day of January 1929 the Deceased 
Luisa Allen a widow deeded by quit claim deed to the 
Appellant and the Respondent Edward F. Allen the 
following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah; to-wit: 
Commencing at a point 21;2 rods North of 
the Southeast Corner of Lot 8, Block 41~ Plat 
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"B", Salt Lake City Survey; thence North 2% 
rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 21f2 rods; 
thence East 10 rods to beginning 
and thereupon the said Luisa Allen, Deceased delivered 
said deed to the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah for the purpose of record, and the same 
was recorded in accordance with her request, and that 
said deed, upon such record was returned to her, and 
that she retained the instrument until her death occurred 
on the 2nd day of July 1947. That in said last mentioned 
deed, the Deceased retained a lifeesta te in and to the 
premises involved. (Tr. 2.) 
That on the 12th day of September 1946 the said 
Luisa Allen made and executed a quit claim deed to the 
Respondents, to-wit; Edward F. Allen and Peggy Allen, 
his wife, conveying unto them the realty involved in the 
litigation. (Tr. 7.) 
The defense to the first deed involved is by way of 
equitable defense and counter-claim ''rherein Respond-
ents allege several defenses, to-wit: 
FIRST: That the first deed in question was never 
delivered, therefore second deed good. 
SECOND: That in the event the first deed v,ras de-
livered, it "ras a will, and therefore null and void. 
THIRD: Moneys spent upon said :premises by 'vay 
of offset, contributions and subrogation, to-,vit: repairs, 
payment of mortgage, taxes, insurance and general 
upkeep. (See Pleadings 1 to 127.) 
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The respondent Ed"~ard F, Allen testified in the 
trial of said cause that the payments made by hin1 sub-
sequent to the first deed in issue, January 12th, 1929 
were made gratuitously, voluntarily and of his own free 
":ill and accord, and that he knew nothing at the time of 
said payments concerning the first deed in question. 
(Tr. 92-132.) 
That at or about the time the Deceased passed R\vay, 
the respondents obtained from her the second deed in 
question, at which time the Deeeased was aged, infirm 
and ill. That the respondents thought that the Appellant 
knew of the second conveyance, 'vhen made, but "\Vas. 
not sure. ( Tr. 23-63, 92-132.) 
The home involved herein had a rental value of 
a:Ptpro:ximately $75.00 per month from the year 1929 to 
the present time. (Tr. 79-81.) That the Deceased served 
the respondent together with his 'Yife over a period of 
years of the value for said services in the sum of $50.00 
per month. (Tr. 83-85.) 
That the Respondents "\vaived by virtue of stipula-
tion their defense hy way of contrib_ution, subrogation 
and equitable defenses, and stand upon the second deed 
as executed by the Deceased, and wrhich the Trial Court 
held to .be valid whieh is the main issue involved herein. 
(Tr. 129-145.) 
That subsequent to tT an nary 12th, 1929 or the exeeu-
tion of the first deed in question tax notices "Tere sent 
out by the Treasurer's Office, Salt l.Jake County, State 
of TJtah, to thP threr partie~ namPd in ~aid deed, to-,Yit: 
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Livinia Allen, Edward F. Allen and Luisa Allen, ad-
dressed to 334 South 9th East Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, said notices being sent out annually from 1929 
on up1 to and including 1947. 
The Appellant resided in the home in question from 
1929, date of the first deed on up until May 1936 at 
which time she married and vacated said premises and 
returned to said home in 1943 for the purpose of taking 
care of her Deceased Mother, and has resided therein 
ever since that date. (Tr. 288.) 
That the Res:pondent Edward F. Allen resided part 
time alone and part time 'vith his wife in said residenee 
since the date of the first deedfor a period of fifteen 
years and five months. (Tr. 289.) 
Neither party paid rent on said premises during 
said period of time with the exception of Appellant and 
Respondent Ed"rard F. Allen contributing money and 
services for the maintenance and support of the Mother. 
That Edward F. Allen gave the money each year for the 
payment of said taxes based upon the First Deed, and 
the Mother made the :payments to the County Treasurer, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah for the purpose of 
obtaining her Widow's exemption. That Edward F. 
Allen and his wife Peggy Allen left in the year 1943 
for Tennessee, at which time the Appellant moved back 
in the home for the purpose of caring for the mother 
at the solicitation of Mrs. Peggy Allen, respondent, and 
remained in the home up until on or about the 12th 
day of September 1946, during which period of time the 
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.A.ppellant paid all of the bills for c.oal, water and gro-
ceries and attended to the wants of her mother, (Tr. 
287, 288.) 
The respondents returned from T·ennessee on or 
about the 12th day of Se:ptember 1946, at which time 
Edward F. Allen obtained the services of a lawyer and 
had deed prepared in favor of Respondents conveying 
the title of said realty to them, and due to the physical 
condition of Mrs. Luisa Allen at such time she swore 
under oath over the telephone to a Notary Public (Tr. 
287) and he had same recorded 'vith the County Re-
corder, Salt Lake County, State of lTtah. 
That the said Luisa Allen died in Salt Lake County, 
Stote of lTtah on Julp 2nd, 1947. (Tr. 2.) 
That "Jlrs. Luisa Allen at no time or at all repudi-
ated the deed executed in favor of Appellant and Re-
spondent in 1929, and when asked by the Appellant v.rhy 
she had executed the second deed of 1946, she merely 
stated that Edw,.ard F. Allen wanted the property. (Tr. 
394. 
That at all times the Appellant kne'v of the execution 
of the deed of 1929 in her favor~ as she and her mother 
went to the Office ofanAttorney for the express purpose 
of having same drafted and duly exeeuted. (Tr. 393.) 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Appellant assigns as error the following upon which 
she relies for a reversal of the judgment, decree and 
orders of the court: 
1. That the findings and decree are not supported 
by the evidence. 
2. That the court erred In denying Appellant's 
Motion for New Trial. 
3. That the court erred in upholding the deed 
under date of September 12, 1946, and failing to uphold 
the deed of January 12, 1929. 
4. The court erred in admitting in evidence all 
conversations had between deceased and respondents 
or either of them. 
ARGUMENTS OF POINTS 1, 2, AND 3 
That the evidence conclusively shows that the deed 
of January 12, 1929 was delivered by the· deceased to 
the grantees, the appellant and respondent in this action 
where the deceased reserved a life estate unto herslf. 
After the execution by Luisa Allen of said deed, she 
had same recorded with the County Recorder of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and Ap;pellant contends by 
virtue of this fact that such deed was duly delivered. 
''It is already settled that the recording of 
a deed constitutes delivery to the grantee" 
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Fooshee vs. Kasenberg, 102 Pac. 2d, 995 ICan. 
Balin v~. Osoba, 91 Pac, 37, 76 Kan. 234. 
Carver vs. :Nlain, 69 Pac. 2d 681, 146 Kan. 
231-237. 
''Where the deed is intentionally recorded hy 
the grantor, manual delivery of the deed there-
after is not necessary to make it effectual''. 
Turner vs. Close, 264 Pac. 1047, 125 Kan. 485. 
"In the absence of express disclaimer, the 
acceptance by the grantee is presumed''. 
Wuester vs. Folin, 56 Pac. 490, 60 l{an. 334. 
Miller vs. Miller, 131 Pac. I__;.R.A. 1915-A,· 671 
"'"-\ nn. Cas. 1917-A, 918. 
That the recording of said deed by the said Luisa 
Allen was constructive notice to the world pertaining 
to said conveyance. 
In the case of Payne vs. Henderson, 172 N.E. 173, 
340 lll. 160, a1nong other things held: 
"3. That the reservation of a life estate in 
the Grantor raises a prestnnption that the deed i:-; 
intended to operate immediately as a conveyance 
of the future estate 'vhieh is vest in possession at 
the termination of the life estate and in such case 
the retention of the deed by the grantor is not 
inconsistent with the idea that delivery "\Va~ in-
tended, and that it is operative~ a;;;; therE' "\vonld 
be no object in retaining n life estate if the deed 
\vere not to be effectual as a convE~yanrP or \\·a~ 
retained to prevent its taking effect until the 
death of the grantor". 
"4. Where a grantor has rPser,~P(l a lifP 
estate in the land conveyed by· him. he is as mneh 
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entitled to the custody of the deed as the grantee. 
Also to the same effect Humphreys vs. Hum-
phreys, 300 Ill. 46". 
'' 5. Where a grantor has .conveyed a five· 
acre tract to his granddaughter by way of volun-
taryt settlement, reserving in himself a life estate, 
·the fact that he subsequently sold an adjoining 
tract "'\\7hich because of some unexplained error 
included an eleven foot strip off the five acres 
does not show that his previous deed to his grand-
daughter 'vas not intended to be effective.'' 
Also to the same effect Riegel vs. Riegel, 243 lll. 
622, Hill vs. Greiger, 250 Ill. 408. 
In the case of Johnson vs. Young Men's Bldg. & 
Loan Association, 60 S.W. 2d 925, 187 Ark. 430, the 
court held: 
''Acceptance of deed to a son from his par-
ents will be presumed where the grant is bene-
ficial to him. A deed to a minor son from his 
parents may be accepted by them for him. Where 
parents executed a deed to their son intending to 
retain possession of the property deed to their 
son until death of one of the parents, their reten-
tion of the deed and failure to record it held not 
to overcome the presumption of delivery, 
Where parents executed a deed to their son 
intending to retain possession of the :property 
until the death of one of the grantors, their con-
tinued possession and control and leasing of the 
property held not to nullify the apparent inten-
tion of delivery. Since the grantor had the inten-
tion, and purpose of retaining the possession of 
the property until the death of one or the other 
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of them, they had the right to retain the deed to 
effect this purpose''. 
In the case of Graham vs. Suddeth, 97 Ark. 283, 
133 S.W. 1023, the court held: 
''The acceptance of deed is presumed where 
the grant is beneficial to the grantee''. 
The court held in Gribbs vs. Walker, 74 Ark. 104, 
85 s.w. 224: 
"The fact that a deed \vas found among his 
papers at his death raises no presumption against 
delivery if the grantor reserved an interest in the 
property conveyed and therefore had an interest 
in the preservation of the deed''. 
In the case of McKemey YS. l{etchum, 188 Iowa, 
1081, 175 N.W. 325, the court held: 
''Delivery will be presumed from the execu-
tion and acknovvledgement of the deed, together 
\Yith testimony tending to shovv intention to pass 
title even though grantor retain~ full possession 
of deed until his death.'' 
In the case of La,vson vs. Boo, 287 N.W. 282., lo"\\7a, 
the Con rt held : 
/ 
' 'After being signed and ackno,vledged by 
the grantor, is placed on record by him 'vith inten-
tion of making the ·record stand for delivery~ 
title will pass to the grantee assuming that there 
is acceptance by them of th0 title''. 
In the case of J\lliller vs. Miller, 91 Kans. 1, L.R.A. 
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1915-A, 671, 'Ann. Cas. 1917 -A, 918, the court held: 
"The remainders are not accelerated by the 
refusal of: the son to accept the conveyance of the 
life estate to him. The recording of the deed by 
the grantor made deed effective as to all persons 
benefited by it, who did not dissent. The inten-
tion of the grant is to be ascertained from the 
language employed in the deed". 
The case of Wuester vs. Folin, 60 Kans. 334, 56 
Pac. 490, the court held: 
''A formal acceptance by the grantee is not 
required. Where the grant is clearly beneficial 
to the grantee, his acceptance of it is presumed 
in the absence of Jlroof to the contrary, and this 
presumption is not overcome of anything short 
of the actual dissent of the granteP ". 
"Where the grantor reserves a life estate 
in the property and it's possession and control, 
his retention of the deed is not inconsistent with 
the idea that 8l delivery was intended.'' 
See 18 Corpus Juris Section 96, page 201- Note 48. 
Appellant calls the court's attention to Section 78-3-2 
Volume 4, Utah Code Annotated 1943 
''Every conveyance or instrument in writing 
affecting real ·estate executed, acknowledged or 
provided and certified in the manner .prescribed 
by this title, and every patent to lands within this 
state duly executed and verified according to 
la,v, and every judgment, order or decree of any 
Court of record in this State or a copy thereof 
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required by law to be recorded in the Office of 
the County Recorder shall from the time of filing 
of the same with the recorder for record import 
notice to all persons of the contents thereof and 
subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien 
holders shall be deemed to purchase and take 
"ith notice.'' 
In the case of Sheppick vs. Sheppick et al, 138 Pac. 
1169 (Utah) 
''Wherein a man and woman had a large 
. family of children, the oldest of whom was nine-
teen years of age. He purchased acreage and a 
small home for his Mother and Father, ~paying 
$300.00 therefor, and obtaining a deed running 
in his favor to the permises. The Mother and 
Father were old, sick and indigent. They took 
possession and raised their family. The court 
held under all circumstances that the Father 
held and o1vned a life estate therein, and that the 
son, who purchased the premises held the fee 
thereto as remainderman. That the father and 
mother, during their life time paid the taxes 
assessed against the premises. They tore do,vn 
the home and erected a new home, cultivated the 
soil and planted fruit trees. That at the time the 
father died, the value of the property had been 
increased from $300.00 to approximately $1500.00, 
and the heirs of the deceased attempted to obtain 
contribution by 1vay of the impro-vements that 
enhanced the value of the premises 'vherein said 
court stated: 
''No doubt the court based its con elusion 
upon the fact that the value of the land had been 
enhanced through the efforts and labor of the 
defendant and his family. '''hile it is true that 
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the purchase :price of the land was only $300.00 or 
$350.00 and that the value thereof with the im-
provements which were placed thereupon by the 
family was at the time of the trial sho,vn to be 
about $1500.00, yet it is also true that defendant 
and the family enjoyed the use of the land during 
all those years ·with whatever improvements they 
placed thereon. And then the equities therefore 
were not all in favor of plaintiff or defendant. 
The legal title of said land was and now is in 
plaintiff's name, and that gives him the right to 
the whole land unless he has voluntarily disposed 
of it or has been legally deprived of his title". 
''We know of no principal, either legal or 
equitable by which the plaintiff under the facts 
and circumstances of this case can be deprived of 
his land, or any part thereof. If we could deal 
with the matter in accordance with 'vhat may be 
termed fireside equity or justice or from a purely 
moral point of vie"\\r, we should pTohably not feel 
inclined to criticise the result reached by the 
District Court. We are reminded, however that 
courts under our system of jurisprudence are not 
autocrats, and that their judgments and decrees 
must be sanctioned by and passed upon estab-
lished legal and equitable rules, and not upon 
Inere moral rights or claims, From a moral point 
of view, the plaintiff should perhaps share the 
enhanced value of the property with his brothers 
and sisters, but we know of no legal or equitable 
principal by which he can he required to do so. 
Both the father and mother having died, he is 
entitled to claim his own. The District Court 
therefore erred in attempting to enforce \Vhat . 
. may be termed to be a purely moral obligation". 
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ARGUMENT ON POINT 4 
The court allowed Edward F. Allen and Peggy 
All·en, his wife, respondents to testify to conversations 
had with the deceased in reference to the deeds• in issue 
in this case, and that appellant objected to said witnesses · 
introducing said conversations under what is commonly 
known as the death statute, and the court granted ap-
:pellant a standing obj·ection thereto, but allowed said 
evidence to ,be placed in the record by the said 'vitnesses. 
Section 104-49.-2 Utah Code Annotated 1943, Volume 
6, Subdivision 3 : 
"A party to any civil action, suit or :pro-
ceeding, and any person directly interested in the 
event thereof, and any person from, through or 
under whom such party or interested person de-
rives his interest or title or any part thereof, 
when the adverse party in such action, suit or 
proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends 
as Guardian of an insane or devisee of any de-
ceased person or as Guardian, assignee or grantee 
directly or remotely of such heir, legatee or de-
visee as to any staten1ent by, or transaction \Yith 
such deceased, insane or incompetent person or 
matter of fact, \vhatever \vhich must have been 
equally within the kno\vledge of both the 'vit-
nesses, and such insane, incompetent or deceased 
person unless such \Vi bH\ss is called to testify 
thereto by such adverse party so claiming or 
opposing, suing or defending in such action. suit 
or proeeeding". 
Subdivision (3) of this section applies 'vherever 
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and whenever the interest of the witnesses called are 
hostile and adverse to, and in conflict with the interests 
of the person against whom they are called. Such wit-
nesses being parties to the action, and directly interested 
in the event thereof. 
Mawson vs. Gray, 78 U. 542, 551, 6 Pac. 2d~ 
" 157. 
STATEMENT AND· ARGUMENT UPON THE 
P ARTICIJLAR QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
The main issue involved in this case at this time is 
whether or not the first deed executed on January 12, 
1929 by the deceased, wherein she reserved a life estate 
in and to said premises, is valid. In connection with its 
validity, there is only one question raised, to-wit: Was 
said deed delivered in accordance with law~ On this 
question the record conclusively shows that the deed 
vvas regularly signed and executed by the deceased, and 
thereafter by her recorded with the County Recorder 
of Salt Lake County, and that at all times mentioned the 
appellant knew of such conveyance. The respondents 
· having testified that they knew nothing of same until 
after they obtained a deed to said premises by virtue of 
the conveyance under date of September 12, 1946. That 
Luisa Allen retained possession of the deed of 1929 
after it had been recorded on up until the time of her 
death, "\Vhich is not inconsistent with delivery of title, 
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and the logical thing to do by a party who holds a life 
estate and the remainderman named therein receiving 
no title to the premises until her death. That since the 
year 1929 up to the year of 1947 inclusive, tax notices 
were sent annually to the place of the abode of the 
parties to this action, and upon said tax notices appeared 
the names of the three parties named in said deed. That 
Edward F. Allen paid the taxes upon said premises in 
accordanee with said tax notices, and that the said 
Edward F. Allen occupied said premises as his home 
since the year 1929 over a period of fifteen years and 
five months. That at no time or at all did the appellant 
disaffirm her interest in and to said deed, and whatever 
Edward F. Allen desired to do "rith his interest therein 
was his privilege, although at this stage of the case, he 
has openly rejected and renounced any interest in and to 
said conveyance. The "\vriter sincerely contends that the 
facts and circumstances in this case surrounding the 
first deed in question conclusively shows an unqualified 
delivery under la,,r. 
The second deed llpheld by the Trial ,Judge executed 
years subsequent to the first deed conveyed, if any thing, 
the deceased's life entate, and upon her demise any 
interest in and to said property by virtue of said con-
veyance was extinguished. Ed,vard F. Allen testified 
that all payments that he n1ade as shown by the Bill of 
Particulars in this case 'vere made for the sole benefit 
of his mother, and were made voluntarily and gratu~­
tously, and not for the purpose of protecting him as a 
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remainderman under the first deed for the reason that 
he at no time knew anything about the first conveyance, 
and still in view of the fact by virtue of numerous plead-
ings asked for contribution and subrogation, and after 
claiming contribution and subrogation, he ·and his wife 
demanded the entire property by virtue of the second 
deed. The position taken in· this case by the respondents 
by virtue of their equitable counter-claims involves dis-
tinct equitable actions which are repugnant to and in-
consistent 'vith one another: 
1st : They rely upon the first quit claim 
under date of January 12, 1929, and demanded 
contribution and subbrogation. 
2nd: They relJi upon second deed under date 
of Sept. 12, 194"6, claiming title to said premises 
thereunder. 
3rd : That the deed of January 12, 1929 was 
in truth and in fact executed by Luisa Allen as 
her Last Will & Testament and therefore void, 
although the respondent Ed"\\rard F. Allen made 
the respective payments by virtue of the fact that 
he was heir at la"\\7 of his deceased mother, and 
made them to protect his right of inheritance 
together with that of the Appellant, his sister. 
It is fundamental in equitable jurisprudence that a 
party cannot claim relief u:pon matters and things that 
are not germane to his original elaim, and it is apparent 
by the pleadings in this case that the respondents desired 
to set up as many distinct and separate transactions 
upon which to stand as could be conceived, and of course, 
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it is a cardinal principal of equity that a party s-eeking 
relief must show good faith, and as the records now 
stand, there is only one proposition involved, and that is, 
which of the deeds: in question are valid. 
There is no dispute between the parties that the 
reasonable rental value of the !premises in issue was 
and is $75.00 per month. That over a period of fifteen 
years, and five months the respondents occupied said 
premises, and under the record in this case the propor-
tionate part of respondents' rental value would be In 
excess of the sums that 'vere paid by them. 
Appellant sincerely contends that the Trial Court 
erred in holding that the first deed was invalid for lack 
of delivery, and in upholding the second deed thereby 
vesting title in respondents and that said cause should 
be reversed with instructions to the Trial Judge to enter 
proper Findings, Decree and Judgment in accordance 
with the contention of appellant herein, Appellant should 
recover her costs and expenses incurred in this Appeal. 
Respectfully su bmi tterl, 
WM. r~. BEEZLEY, 
Attorney fo1'" Appellant. 
• .,.il 
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